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ABSTRACT
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social
capital.  We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it.  In the model, distrust creates
public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading
to multiple equilibria.  A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want
more government intervention even though the government is corrupt.  We test this and other implications
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1 Introduction
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated
with social capital. We document, and try to explain, this highly significant empirical
correlation. The correlation works for a range of measures of social capital, from trust in
others to trust in corporations and political institutions, as well as for a range of measures
of regulation, from product markets, to labor markets, to judicial procedures.
We present a simple model explaining this correlation. In the model, people make
two decisions: whether or not to become civic (invest in social capital), and whether to
become entrepreneurs or choose routine (perhaps state) production. We accept a broad
view of civicness or social capital, namely that it is a broad cultural attitude. Those
who have not invested in social capital impose a negative externality on others when
they become entrepreneurs (e.g., pollute), while those who have invested do not. The
community (whether through voting or through some other political mechanism) regulates
entry into entrepreneurial activity when the expected negative externalities are large. But
regulation itself must be implemented by government oﬃcials, who demand bribes if they
had not invested in social capital. As a consequence, when entrepreneurship is restricted
through regulation, investment in social capital may not pay.
In this model, when people expect to live in a civic community, they expect low levels
of regulation and corruption, and so invest in social capital. Their beliefs are justified, and
investment leads to civicness, low regulation, and high levels of entrepreneurial activity.
When in contrast people expect to live in an uncivic community, they expect high levels
of regulation and corruption, and do not invest in social capital. Their beliefs again are
justified, as lack of investment leads to uncivicness, high regulation, high corruption, and
low levels of entrepreneurial activity. The model has two equilibria: a good one with a
large share of civic individuals and no regulation, and a bad one, where a large share of
uncivic individuals support heavy regulation.
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The model explains the correlation between regulation and distrust, but also has a
number of additional implications, which we bring to the data. The model predicts, most
immediately, that distrust influences not just regulation itself, but also the demand for
regulation. Using the World Values Survey, we show both in a cross-section of countries,
and in a sample of individuals from around the world, that distrust fuels support for gov-
ernment control over the economy. What is perhaps most interesting about this finding,
and also consistent with the model’s predictions, is that distrust generates demand for
regulation even when people realize that the government is corrupt and ineﬀective; they
prefer state control to unbridled activity by uncivic entrepreneurs.
The most fundamental implication of the model, however, is that culture (as mea-
sured by distrust) and institutions (as measured by regulation) coevolve. Culture shapes
institutions, and institutions shape culture. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to test this
prediction of the model using instrumental variables, since many exogenous factors that
influence trust might also directly influence regulation, and vice versa.1 We take the evi-
dence on the demand for regulation as consistent with, if not proving, causality running
from distrust to regulation. To consider whether regulation influences trust, we look at
the experiment of transition from socialism, which we interpret as a radical reduction
in government control in low trust societies. Our model predicts that such a reduction
should lead to 1) a reduction in output, 2) an increase in corruption, 3) an increase in
demand for government control at a given level of trust, and 4) a reduction in trust in
the short run. We present evidence supporting these predictions using the World Values
Survey and the Life in Transition Survey, the latter devoted to former socialist economies.
Although our paper combines ideas about regulation and distrust in an apparently
novel way, it follows a large literature on related topics. Following Banfield (1958), Gam-
1For example, one can think of using legal origins as instruments for regulation (see, e.g., Djankov
et al. 2002, La Porta et al. 2008), but to the extent that colonizing Europeans who transplanted legal
traditions also transplanted aspects of culture, the instrument would not be valid.
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betta (1988) and Coleman (1990), Putnam (1993) reinvigorated research on social capital
by showing tremendous dispersion of levels of trust and social capital across Italian re-
gions as well as the ability of social capital measures to predict government performance.
Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et al. (1997) are early empirical studies showing
that social capital predicts good economic outcomes in a cross-section of countries. Re-
cent studies in a related vein are Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Algan and Cahuc (2009),
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2006), Tabellini (2005), and Bloom et al. (2007). 2
Three recent strands in research have further advanced this area. First, Tabellini
(2007) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2007a) present new evidence of deep historical
roots of modern variation in trust among regions of Europe and Italy, consistent with
Putnam’s view that trust is a measure of highly persistent culture. Bisin and Verdier
(2001), Tabellini (2008), and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2007b) focus on explicit
cultural transmission of beliefs within families, which is in part shaped by economic
incentives. Guiso et al. (2006) and Algan and Cahuc (2007) oﬀer empirical evidence
consistent with these models using data on US-immigrants. These papers, however, do
not note the connection between distrust and regulation, nor the role of regulation in
undermining social capital accumulation.
A second related literature deals with the political demand for regulation and gov-
ernment control more generally. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) follow the large historical
literature on the rise of the regulatory state in the US at the beginning of the 20th century
to argue that the demand for regulation results from perceived unfairness of the existing
social order. Di Tella and McCulloch (2006) argue that voters in developing countries
dislike capitalism because it is associated with high levels of corruption. Landier et al.
(2007) similarly examine cultural attitudes to capitalism. Pinotti (2008) is a contempora-
2Landes (1998), La Porta et al. (1997, 1999), Guiso et al. (2003), and Stulz and Williamson (2003)
measure culture using religious aﬃliations, and also examine its eﬀects on outcomes, whereas Licht et
al.(2003) introduce psychological measures of culture.
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neous paper closest to ours. He also shows empirically that distrust increases the demand
for regulation, although his theoretical focus is on the diﬀerences in beliefs among agents
rather than on multiple equilibria. Djankov et al. (2003b) present a broader discussion
of these arguments, in which the demand for public control is a response to disorder; our
paper advances this argument by emphasizing distrust as the source of disorder.
A third literature makes the point that the causal link runs not only from beliefs to
policies but from policies to beliefs as well. Piketty (1995) started the research on co-
evolution of beliefs and behavior. Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) describe large variation
in beliefs about redistribution across European countries, and show how these beliefs influ-
ence, and are influenced by, actual redistribution policies. Alesina and Angeletos (2005b)
show how redistribution leads to corruption, which in turn generates demand for redistri-
bution. Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008) show that minimum wage policies undermine
the ability of firms and workers to learn about each others’ cooperative attitudes, and that
low cooperation in turns creates a demand for wage policies. Carlin et al. (2007) argue,
similarly to our paper, that trust and regulation are substitutes in financial markets.
Our paper is distinguished from this research in two central ways. First, we consider
the two-way relationship between cultural attitudes and the role of the government in the
economy at a broader level than the previous papers. Second, our model and analysis
explain what is perhaps one of the central puzzles in research on political beliefs: why it
is that people in countries with bad governments want more government intervention?
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the basic relationship between regulation
and distrust. Section 3 presents our model and its main implications. Section 4 doc-
uments the empirical relationship between distrust and attitudes toward the state and
markets. Section 5 examines the eﬀect of regulation on distrust by looking at the tran-
sition experience. Section 6 looks at the evidence on educational values across countries,
as a further test of the model’s predictions. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Basic facts
This section correlates distrust and government regulation across countries. The exact
definitions of variables are summarized in the Appendix.
2.1 Data on distrust
We use data on distrust from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS database is
an international social survey consisting of four main waves 1981-84, 1990-93, 1995 and
1999-2003, denoted henceforth 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000. This survey provides a range
of indicators of distrust in others, in markets, and in institutions for a large sample of
countries.
The basic measure of distrust comes from the following question: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing
with people?”. We construct a distrust indicator equal to 0 if the respondent answers
“Most people can be trusted” and 1 if she answers “Can’t be too careful”. We take the
country average level of distrust over the four waves.
We also use indicators of distrust associated with the lack of civic spirit.3 We use the
following question from the World Values Survey: “Do you think that it is unjustifiable to
cheat on government benefits?”. The answer ranges from 1 for “never justifiable” to 10
for “always justifiable”. We define the proportion of uncivic households as those who do
not think that it is never justifiable to cheat on public benefits.
Distrust can also be measured with respect to instutions such as business, unions or
the legal and political systems. We consider the following set of questions provided by
the WVS : “Do you have a lot of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much
confidence, no confidence at all in the following : Major Companies? Unions ? Justice ?
3As stressed by Glaeser et al. (2000), the question about trust may capture trustworthiness of others
rather than trust in others.
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Parliamentary democracy?”. The answers range from 1 for a lot of confidence, 2 for quite
a lot of confidence, 3 for a little confidence, to 4 for no confidence. We create a dummy
equal to 1 if the respondent chooses the answer no confidence, and zero otherwise. We
thus have four dummy variables distrust in companies, distrust in organized labor, distrust
in legal system, and distrust in political system. We have also checked the robustness of
the results using the originally coded variables, without finding any significant change.
2.2 Data on regulation
To measure regulation, we start with government regulation of entry. We use Djankov
et al. (2002) data on the number of steps that an entrepreneur must complete to open a
business legally. The measure is available for the year 1999 and covers almost all countries
present in the WVS database. We also use an index of the frequency of price controls by
the state. Gwartney et al. (1996) construct an index of the extent to which companies
can set prices freely, from 0 for no freedom at all to 10 for perfect freedom. La Porta et
al. (2002) use the average of this index for the two available years 1989 and 1994 as a
measure of price controls.
Next, we look at the regulation of the labor market. Botero et al. (2004) construct an
index of the rigidity of employment regulation that aggregates three areas: i) Diﬃculty
of hiring, ii) Rigidity of hours, and iii) Diﬃculty of firing. We also use a measure of the
extent of state regulation of the minimum wage, which takes into account the existence
of a statutory legal minimum wage and the potential exceptions based on age, skills,
industries, or regions. This index is from Aghion et al. (2008) and covers 21 OECD
countries. We also look at formalism of legal procedures from Djankov et al. (2003a).
Using these data, we can estimate the empirical relationship between distrust and reg-
ulation for a maximum of 57 countries. The list includes: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
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Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Mexico, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sin-
gapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanziana, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
The sample of countries changes slightly depending on the indicators for distrust and the
type of regulation we are looking at.
2.3 The correlation between distrust and regulation
We present five figures illustrating the relationship between distrust and regulation. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the strong positive correlation between the regulation of entry as measured
by the (ln)-number of steps to open a business, and the country level of distrust. High-
trusting countries such as Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries impose very few controls on
opening a business while low-trusting countries, typically Mediterranean, Latin-American,
and African countries, impose heavy regulations. One-third of the cross-country variation
in the regulation of entry is associated with distrust. Figure 2 presents the evidence of
a strong negative correlation between the freedom that firms enjoy in setting their prices
and distrust. The R2 is 0.34.
Figure 3 and 4 present the relationship between regulation of the labor market and
distrust. Figure 3 shows a strong positive correlation between the rigidity of employment
contracts and distrust. Nordic countries such as Finland, Norway, and Sweden are outliers
in this figure. Yet, when we focus on state regulation of the minimum wage (Aghion et al.,
2008), these Nordic countries fit much more with the other high-trusting countries such
as Denmark or Anglo-Saxon countries. The indice of state regulation of wage include the
existence of a legal statutory minimum wage in the country, the ratio of the minimum
wage to the median wage, the existence of potential derogations from the law, such as
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the provision of sub-minimum wages for certain categories. A higher score indicates
heavier regulation by the state. Figure 4 shows a strong positive correlation between
state regulation of the minimum wage and distrust; 65 percent of the variance in distrust
is explained by state regulation of wages. Figure 5 shows that the same relationship holds
between distrust and judicial formalism.
Table 1 confirms these correlations in regressions controlling for the log per capita
GDP, the average years of education, and population (Mulligan and Shleifer 2005). The
correlation between regulation and distrust in others is statistically significant at the one
percent level in most cases. In contrast, per capita income and education does not predict
regulation.4
Table 2 shows that the correlation between distrust and regulation holds also for
distrust in institutions. We use the regulation of entry as our measure of regulation. The
correlation is statistically significant with the same controls as used in Table 1.
The correlation between regulation and distrust does not hold for the subsample of
poor countries. In this subsample, controlling for education and population raises the
significance of the correlation between distrust and regulation, but does not suﬃce. Some
key outliers are transition economies displaying low regulation and high distrust. We
later provide a rationale for this relationship in transition economies: they are not in
equilibrium.
4We have also checked the eﬀects of democracy and ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine
1997, Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Alesina et al. 2003). Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the
ethnolinguistic fragmentation variable of Alesina et al. (2003). Democracy is measured by the average
Polity IV score over for the period 1980-2000. These additional variables are not statistically significant.
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Figure 1: Distrust and Regulation of entry. Regulation is measured by the (ln)-number
of procedures to open a firm. Sources: World Values Survey and Djankov et al. (2002).
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no freedom at all to 10 for perfect freedom. Source: World Values Survey and La Porta
et al. (2002).
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Figure 3: Distrust and Rigidity of employment index. Sources: World Values Survey and
Botero et al. (2004).
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3 The model
We present a simple model of the interplay between distrust and regulation, with causality
running in both directions. We use the model to organize the empirical work; in many
instances, we make extremely strong assumptions to simplify and clarify the analysis.
The starting point of the model is the family choice of civicness of their children.
Children are taught either how to behave in a civic way, learning tolerance, mutual respect
and independence, or to only cooperate with family members and to behave selfishly
outside the family, even if selfishness leads to corruption.5 This assumption captures an
important distinction stressed by sociologists between limited and generalized morality.
Norms of limited morality are applicable to a narrow circle of friends and relatives only.
Banfield (1958) refers to these family values as amoral familism. Norms of generalized
morality instead are meant to apply to everyone and to induce individuals to behave in a
civic way with a larger range of other anonymous persons.
There is a continuum of risk neutral individuals of mass one. There is labor and a
numeraire good produced with labor. The timing of events is as follows:
1. Individuals choose to become either civic or uncivic. Either kind of family education
is free. Following his civic or uncivic education, the individual can become either a
routine producer (perhaps working for the state factory) or an entrepreneur. Everyone’s
productivity in routine production is normalized to zero. Routine production imposes
no negative externalities on society. If an individual becomes an entrepreneur, he can
produce an additional y units of the numeraire good if he is uncivic, and y+ε if he is civic.
Individuals learn their y after education, but before they vote on policies (see below). We
assume that y is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1] and that ε is very small; it is
5We generally think of the investment in civicness as being made in families, although we recognize
that formal schooling can play a role as well (Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007). It is important for
us, however, that civicness choices are individual, not collective.
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only used in the model to break ties.6
As an entrepreneur, each uncivic individual also generates a negative externality of
e > 1 per every member of the society. Civic individuals do not generate negative
externalities when they become entrepreneurs. We think of the negative externalities
as pollution, production of low quality goods that imposes risks on the community, or
perhaps even cheating. Denote by α the fraction of the population that becomes civic.
2. People vote to regulate entry into entrepreneurship or to leave it unrestricted. We
assume that voting leads to the socially preferred policy, which would obtain, for example,
in the Persson-Tabellini (2000) probabilistic voting model.7 We assume that the society
does not have the option to stop all entrepreneurship, but at least in a market economy
must rely on oﬃcials to implement the regulation of entry. Oﬃcials can forbid or allow
entry, but they do not observe the individual’s output y and whether he is civic or uncivic.
3. Entrepreneurs produce if entry is authorized. People work as oﬃcials at night
(alternatively, oﬃcials are drawn randomly from the population), so there is no decision
to become an entrepreneur or an oﬃcial.8 We assume that a civic oﬃcial, fearful of a large
negative externality, always bans entry. (Indeed in equilibrium this will be the optimal
policy.) If an oﬃcial is not civic, he uses his power as the implementer of the rule to
demand a bribe to authorize entry regardless of the entrepreneur’s type. We assume that
civic entrepreneurs refuse to pay the bribe, but the uncivic ones agree to pay it if it worth
it and enter.9 We denote by b the bribe demanded by uncivic oﬃcials. Recall that
since civicness is private information, it is impossible to forbid entry by the civic and to
6ε can be interpreted as a small private productivity benefit from civicness, which would arise if, for
example, production requires cooperation among individuals over time (see Tabellini, 2005; Algan and
Cahuc, 2007).
7We have also solved the model with simple majority voting. This leads to some complications, but
the same conclusion of multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria with diﬀerent levels of civicness. It also does
not matter whether people learn their y before they vote.
8We could have assumed that public oﬃcials diﬀer from other individuals in their level of civicness.
Yet recent evidence shows that the behavior of public oﬃcials is quite in line with the country-average
level of civicness of their fellow citizens. See Fisman and Miguel (2008) for an analysis of diplomats.
9We could alternatively assume, with similar results, that civic entrepreneurs also agree to pay bribes.
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authorize that by the uncivic. If a prospective entrepreneur is denied entry (either by
a civic oﬃcial or by an uncivic one who does not get his bribe), he returns to routine
production with the productivity of zero. Of course, if uncivic, he can still collect bribes
when serving as an oﬃcial.
The equilibrium in this model is characterized by α (the fraction of individuals who
become civic), the corresponding social choice to regulate on not regulate entry, and the
resulting levels of entrepreneurial activity and output. Conditional on the expected pay-
oﬀs from entrepreneurial activity and government service, individual decisions to become
civic or not are rational and aggregate to the equilibrium α.
Before solving the model, a preliminary remark is in order. We could have assembled a
much simpler model in which there are no government oﬃcials or corruption. Regulation
takes the simple form of prohibiting all production. In that model, there would still be
multiple Pareto ranked equilibria: a good one with civic individuals and low regulation,
and a bad one with uncivic individuals and high regulation. Such a model would deliver
the positive relationship between distrust and regulation. That simple model, however,
leaves unsettled one of the central questions raised by the data, namely why it is the case
that individuals who distrust government nonetheless want more government intervention.
By introducing public oﬃcials into the model, we are able to address this issue and to
generate testable predictions. We also note that there are many ways to introduce corrupt
public oﬃcials into the model: the central substantive assumption is that such oﬃcials
reduce both negative externalities and the incentive to be civic.
We solve the model by backward induction. In the third step, all individuals become
entrepreneurs if entry is unregulated or authorized in step 2. If the society decides to
regulate entry in step 2, every uncivic oﬃcial sets the bribe that maximizes his rent,
equal to the bribe times the share of individuals who agree to pay it
b (1− b) (1− α)
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The maximand reflects the two facts that a) only the uncivic agree to pay bribes
and b) among them, only those with productivity in entrepreneurship above the level of
the bribe actually pay it. The term (1 − b) comes then from the assumption that y is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Under these assumptions, the optimal bribe chosen by
uncivic oﬃcials is equal to 1/2.
We can now compute the social decision to regulate as a function of α. Without
regulation, the expected entrepreneurial output (since everyone enters) is given by:
A =
1
2
+ αε− (1− α)e,
where the first two terms correspond to output and the last is the aggregate externality.
If the society chooses to regulate, the expected entrepreneurial output is given by:
R = (1− α)2
Z 1
1/2
(y − e)dy = (1− α)
2
2
µ
3
4
− e
¶
.
To understand this expression, recall that all civic oﬃcials prohibit entry, and that
when civic entrepreneurs encounter uncivic oﬃcials, they refuse to pay bribes, and there is
no entry either. Entry only occurs when uncivic entrepreneurs encounter uncivic oﬃcials,
and pay bribes (there is the double coincidence of uncivicness). Moreover only the most
productive uncivic entrepreneurs are able to pay the bribe, so they enter and impose a
negative externality on others.
It is easy to show, as illustrated by Figure 6, that there exists a unique threshold value
of α ∈ (0, 1), denoted by α∗, such that A > R if and only if α > α∗.
Now, let us look at the civic education decisions at stage one. The expected payoﬀ of
a civic individual is
1
2
+ ε− (1− α)e if there is no regulation
−(1− α)2 e
2
if there is regulation
(1)
The first two terms in the first row correspond to entrepreneurial output and the last
term is the expected externality from the (1−α) uncivic entrepreneurs absent regulation.
15
0                                                                                                   1     Share of civic individuals 
  α∗         
R         
A         
(1/2)−e  
        
[(3/4)−e]/2          
(1/2)+ε   
       
Social Welfare       
Figure 6: The threshold value α∗ above which regulation yields lower social welfare than
the authorization of production.
With regulation, civic entrepreneurs do not enter but a share (1 − α)2 Pr(y > 1/2) =
(1 − α)2/2 of uncivic entrepreneurs pay bribes, enter (due to the double coincidence of
uncivicness), and impose the negative externality e.
Assuming that people work during the day and are oﬃcials at night, the expected
payoﬀ of an uncivic individual is
1
2
− (1− α)e if there is no regulation
1
8
(1− α) + 1
4
(1− α)− (1− α)2 e
2
if there is regulation
(2)
Every uncivic entrepreneur enters if there is no regulation. With regulation, uncivic
entrepreneurs have to pay a bribe of 1/2 to enter, so only those whose productivity turns
out to be higher than 1/2 and who are regulated by an uncivic oﬃcial enter. For such
entrepreneurs, the expected income from entrepreneurship is equal to 1
8
(1−α). All uncivic
individuals also get income from corruption, equal to the bribe times the probability of
getting to regulate an uncivic entrepreneur whose productivity is higher than 1/2. This
probability is equal to (1− α)/2.
We know that regulation is chosen at stage 2 only when α ≤ α∗. When α > α∗,
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comparing the first rows of equations (1) and (2) shows that individuals prefer becoming
civic. In contrast, when α ≤ α∗, the comparison of the second row of equation (1) with
that of equation (2) shows that becoming uncivic is preferable. If you expect to live in
a corrupt society, you would rather learn to pay and demand bribes. In addition to the
equilibrium with α = 1 and no regulation, there is then an equilibrium in which everyone
is uncivic (α = 0) and entry is regulated.
The two equilibria have very intuitive interpretations. In the good equilibrium, every-
one is civic, individuals do not expect others to impose negative externalities on them,
and hence see no reason to regulate entry. Civicness and trust eliminate the demand for
regulation. At α = 1, output is at the maximum possible level in this economy.
In the bad equilibrium, everyone is uncivic and there are incentives to be uncivic since
entrepreneurs are held up by bribe-takers.10 Entrepreneurs in equilibrium are the most
productive, but also corrupt, individuals. In this equilibrium, even though the regulators
who allow entry are corrupt, they still serve a useful social purpose since, with the society
being largely uncivic, the negative externalities from entry by the relatively unproductive
entrepreneurs whom they deter outweigh the positive benefits. The society would be even
worse oﬀ without the regulation, if all uncivic entrepreneurs were allowed to enter.
This observation creates an interesting implication of our model. Specifically, even
though the regulators are corrupt, the society wants more regulation and further restric-
tions on entry — it wants more government control. To return to Figure 6, people want
output to be closer to the horizontal line at zero, where everyone engages in routine pro-
duction. Uncivic producers, when they enter, earn positive returns for themselves but
impose negative externalities on others. For the public, it is better to have more restric-
tions on entrepreneurs, whether this means state management or more regulation. When
10Even if we assume that civic individuals are willing to pay bribes, there is a bad equilibrium with
α = 0, since regulation creates more opportunities for uncivic individuals to accept bribes when serving
as public oﬃcials.
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individuals distrust others, they prefer government oﬃcials to regulate and control, even
when they know that these oﬃcials themselves cannot be trusted.
This simple model has three interesting implications. First, if we interpret the model
as suggesting that diﬀerent countries are at diﬀerent equilibria, the model explains our
starting fact. High-trust societies exhibit low levels of government regulation, and low-
trust societies exhibit high levels of government regulation.
Second, the model suggests that distrust drives the demand for regulation. In low trust
societies, individuals correctly do not trust business, since business is dishonest. To control
business, they support government regulation, fully recognizing that such regulation leads
to corruption. Government is bad, but business is worse. Individuals in low trust societies
actually want even more government control than they see already, since such control
would weed out even more producers imposing negative externalities. The model thus
predicts the demand for more regulation even when regulation is ineﬀective, and for more
government even when the government is corrupt. We test this prediction below.
We note the important connection of our work to that of DiTella and McCulloch
(2006), who argue that corruption leads to leftist politics and the demand for more gov-
ernment. The authors do not address the paradox of how corrupt government leads to
the demand for more government, but our model explains why. Individuals rationally de-
mand more government, even more of corrupt government, when they see private business
hurting their lives.
Third, our model has some implications for the causal eﬀect of regulation on accumu-
lation of social capital. To examine those, suppose the economy starts from a position
where social capital is below α∗, but all entrepreneurial activity is repressed. We interpret
this starting point as central planning, where everyone engages in routine production, and
normalized output is zero (point P in Figure 7). Suppose that, starting from this point,
the country undergoes liberalization, so the economy moves down to the R-curve for its
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Figure 7: Liberalization in a low trust environment.
level of social capital, where public oﬃcials regulate entry. In Figure 7, this transition
to a regulated market economy can be thought of as a move from point P to point P 0.
What happens now?
If this happens, the model predicts that corruption rises. It also predicts that people
would demand more regulation — a return to the point where entrepreneurial activity is
banned by the state. Perhaps most interestingly, the model predicts that, starting from
this disequilibrium, people reduce their investment in social capital, so trust in others
and in institutions diminishes. Unless social capital is built up, the economy moves
toward the bad equilibrium with zero civicness. We assess this set of predictions using
the experience of transition from socialism.
4 The eﬀect of distrust on the demand for regulation
4.1 Data
In this section, we seek to establish three points related to the first implication of the
model. These are: 1) the political demand for regulation varies across countries, 2)
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countries that have a higher demand for regulation actually have higher regulation, and,
crucially, 3) low trust predicts high demand for regulation, and not just high actual levels
of regulation. We thus hope to identify, as predicted by the model, a causal link from
distrust to regulation working through popular demand. We use three main databases.
We first look at the World Values Survey database that we have described already. We
are mainly interested in three questions concerning attitudes toward competition or state
regulation. The first question reads : “Competition is good: it stimulates people to work
hard and develop new ideas. Or competition is harmful: it brings out the worst in people”.
The variable takes on values from 1 to 10, a lower score indicating a higher level of distrust
of competition. The second question reads: “People should take more responsibility to
provide for themselves or the government should take more responsibility”. The variable
ranges from 1 to 10, with a higher score indicating a stronger support for government
intervention. In addition to these questions, we also look at a question related to the
eﬃciency of the economic system under democracy: “Here are some things that people
sometimes say about a democratic political system: In democracy, the economic system
runs necessarily badly. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or
disagree strongly?”. To make the result more interpretable, we create a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the respondent strongly agrees or agrees with the statement that the economy
runs badly under democracy, and 0 otherwise.
We also look at the International Social Survey Program to measure attitudes towards
specific government regulations. The ISSP database is a compilation of surveys devoted
each year to diﬀerent specific topics such as religion, social networks or the role of gov-
ernment. It has been carried out since 1985. Two specific ISSP surveys on “The role of
government” were carried out in 1990 and 1996. These surveys ask five specific questions
about regulation. The first two assess the views of regulation of wages and prices: “Here
is a list of potential government action for the economy: i) Control prices by law, ii) Con-
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trol wages by law”. The answer can take on values from 1 to 4, with 1 meaning strongly
agree and 4 strongly disagree. To ease the interpretation of the results, we create two
dummy variables for control of wages and of prices by grouping together households who
strongly agree or agree with each government intervention. Three other questions refer to
government control of specific sectors: “Do you think that electricity should be run by the
government or private companies? Hospitals should be run by the government or private
companies? Banks should be run by the government or private companies?”. In 1996, the
answers take on the value 1 to indicate that the sector should be run by the government
and 0 otherwise.
The ISSP surveys on government regulation cover almost all OECD and East Euro-
pean countries. Moreover, the ISSP database contains separate surveys for East and West
Germany. By merging the 1990 and 1996 waves, we get observations for the following 8
East European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovenia, in addition to East Germany. We also have information for the following
19 OECD countries: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The panel of countries is unbalanced
between 1990 and 1996.
Finally, we look more precisely at the relationship between the demand for regulation
and distrust in transition economies. We use the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) con-
ducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank
in 2006. The Life in Transition Survey consists of 28,000 interviews in 28 post-communist
countries in Europe and Central Asia.11 In each country, a sample of 1,000 individuals
was selected randomly for face-to-face interviews. The main question of interest regarding
11Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan.
21
regulation reads:
“Which one of the following statements you agree with the most? (1) A market econ-
omy is preferable to any other form of economic system; (2) Under some circumstances,
a planned economy may be preferable to a market economy (3) For people like me, it
does not matter whether the economic system is organized as a market economy or as a
planned economy.” To measure the preference for a planned economy, we create a dummy
Preference for planning that equals to one if the respondent chooses statement (2) and 0
if he chooses statement (1).
The survey also asks specific questions about trust in others and confidence in public
institutions. Respondents are first asked “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?. What would
it be today?”. In addition individuals are asked: “To what extent do you trust the following
institutions: government, courts, parliament, banks, foreign companies?”. The answers
are given on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means “Complete distrust”, 2 : “Some Distrust”,
3 : “Neither distrust nor trust”, 4 : “Some trust” and 5 : “Complete trust”. To ease the
interpretation of the results, we also use dummy variables equal 1 if the respondent has
some or complete distrust, and 0 if the respondent has some or complete trust.
4.2 Public support for regulation
Figures 8 and 9 display attitudes toward government regulation at the country level,
based on the ISSP database. Figures 8 and 9 report the share of households who strongly
agree or agree with the statement that the government should control wages and prices,
respectively. We measure the country average over the two ISSP surveys in 1990 and in
1996. Former socialist countries such as Russia, Slovenia, East Germany and Bulgaria
exhibit the strongest support for government control of wages. Approximately 92 percent
of Russians and 82 percent of East Germans favor wage control. Respondents in Mediter-
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Figure 8: Share of political support for wage control by law. Source: International Social
Survey Program 1990-1996
ranean countries such as France, Italy and Spain also strongly favor wage control by the
state: 78 percent of the Spaniards and 60 percent of the French agree with the statement.
At the other extreme we find Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries such as Sweden. In these
countries, less than half the population agree with the statement that the government
should control wages. Similar patterns obtain for the support of government control of
electricity and banks.
Figures 10 and 11 show the correlation between political support for regulation and
the objective measures of actual regulation of the goods and labor markets. We use the
(ln) number of steps to open a business and the rigidity of employment index as indicators
of actual regulation. The correlation between the subjective measure of political support
for regulation and the objective measures of regulation is fairly high, the R2 reaching
0.37 for regulation of entry and 0.39 percent for regulation of the labor market. This
result suggests that understanding regulation requires understanding the determinants of
its political support. We present this analysis below.
23
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
G
ov
er
nm
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
co
nt
ro
l p
ric
es
 b
y 
la
w
RUS SP D-E BUL SLV ITA JPN POL CZR FRA NW IRE LAT SWD HG UK W-G CD USA NZ
Figure 9: Share of political support for price control by law. Source: International Social
Survey Program 1990-1996.
AUS
BUL
CD
CZR
FRA
DEU
HG
IRE
ITA
JPN
LVANW
POL
RUS
SVN
SP
SWD
CHEUKUSA
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
of
 e
nt
ry
.4 .6 .8 1
Government should control price by law
R²=0.37
Figure 10: Correlation between regulation of entry and political support for government
control of prices. Source: International Social Survey Program 1990-1996 and La Porta
et al. (2002)
24
AUS
BUL
CD
CZR
FRA
DEU
HG
IRE
ITA
JPN
LVA
NW
POL
RUS
SVNSP
SWD
CHE
UK
USA0
20
40
60
80
R
ig
id
ity
 o
f e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
nd
ex
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Government should control wage by law
R²=0.39
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government control of wages. Source: International Social Survey Program 1990-1996
and Botero et al. (2004)
4.3 Distrust and public support for regulation
Our model predicts that distrust causes support for regulation. In this section, we look
at this prediction.
We begin with simple correlations. Figure 12 through Figure 14 present the correla-
tions at the country level between distrust in others and support for government control
of prices and of specific sectors such as electricity. The indicator of distrust is based on
the four waves of the WVS. The support for government control is given by the indicators
from ISSP in 1990 and 1996. The correlation between distrust and support for regulation
is always positive and significant, the R2 reaching 0.33 for wage control, 0.16 for price
control, and 0.20 for government control of electricity.
Table 3 reports the corresponding micro evidence based on individual answers from
the WVS. We regress the various measures of support for regulation on distrust in others
and distrust in public institutions. The left hand side variables are indicators of support
for regulation and are reported in rows. We control for age, gender, education, income,
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political aﬃliation and country fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level.
Row 1 reports the ordered probit regression for attitudes towards competition. Indi-
viduals who distrust others are more likely to believe that competition is harmful. The
relationship is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Individuals who distrust
private companies, the legal system, or the civic servants also dislike competition. Row
2 shows that distrustful individuals also call for more responsibility of the government;
the relationship is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Row 3 shows that the
same relationship holds between distrust and the belief that the economic system runs
badly under democracy. In the WVS data, distrustful individuals seek greater control by
government, consistent with a central prediction of our model.
Table 4 documents the demand for regulation in transition economies using individual
data from LITS. The left-hand side variable is the preference for a planned rather than a
market economy. The main explanatory variables of interest are distrust in others, distrust
in public institutions, and distrust in companies. We capture these various aspects of
distrust using dummy variables. We also control for age, age squared, education, income
scale, and occupation. In transition countries, the preference for a planned economy
might be driven by the individual hardships during the transition or by a concern about
the economic and social situation in the country. We control for whether the individual
believes that his household lives better now than before 1989 and whether he thinks
that inequality should be reduced. These attitudes are measured by the questions: “The
situation of my household is better today than around 1989” and “The gap between the rich
and the poor today in this country should be reduced”. The answers take on values from
1 to 5, a higher score indicating that the respondent strongly agrees with the statement.
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that distrust in others is positively related to the preference
for a planned economy. The eﬀect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and
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Figure 12: Correlation between distrust and political support for government control of
wages. Source WVS: 1980 - 2000 and ISSP 1990 and 1996.
economically sizeable. Distrust of others increases by 4 percentage points the probability
of preferring a planned economy. This eﬀect is twice as large as that of belonging to the
lower tail of the income distribution or of being unemployed. Columns 2 and 3 of Table
4 document the positive relationship between distrust in public institutions, such as the
government and justice, and preference for a planned economy. Columns 4 and 5 show
that the same pattern holds for distrust in banks and distrust in foreign companies.
In summary, both country-level and individual data, obtained from a variety of datasets,
support our model’s prediction that distrust leads to support for government regulation.
5 The eﬀect of regulation on distrust
Perhaps the more unusual prediction of our model is that regulation itself influences dis-
trust. We have elaborated an implication of this prediction, namely that, in a low trust
society, an exogenous liberalization from the position of nearly full state control would
bring about an increase in disorder and corruption, a demand for re-regulation, and ab-
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Figure 13: Correlation between distrust and political support for government control of
prices. Source WVS: 1980 - 2000 and ISSP 1990 and 1996.
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Figure 14: Correlation between distrust and political support for government control of
electricity. Source WVS: 1980 - 2000 and ISSP 1996.
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sent such re-regulation a decrease in civic education and in trust. In this section, we
assess these predictions in the context of transition economies. Our starting point is the
observation that the rapid transition from socialism to capitalism, and the dismantling
of the communist party and other control mechanisms of the state (Shleifer 1997), can
be seen as reductions of state control from nearly total to something more similar to the
regulatory regime in our model. The communist state stopped all, or nearly all, entrepre-
neurial activity; transition economies allowed private entry but relied on extensive, and
often corrupt, regulation. Consistent with the predictions of our model, output initially
declined in all transition economies (e.g., Blanchard and Kremer 1997). Corruption has
also increased, consistent with the model’s predictions. We need to investigate whether
the initial levels of trust were low in socialist economies, whether liberalization has caused
a demand for re-regulation, and most importantly, whether transition brought about a
reduction in social capital accumulation and growth in distrust. Below, we focus on these
three questions.
5.1 Initial level of distrust in transition economies
We have data on the initial level of distrust in transition economies circa 1990, provided
by the WVS. Figure 15 reports the country levels of distrust for the 1990 wave. We
measure the national component of distrust by estimating the country fixed eﬀects in the
individual-level regression of trust on individual characteristics (age, education, gender,
income, political aﬃliation). The country fixed eﬀect is measured relative to Sweden,
which displays one of the lowest level of distrust in this wave. Figure 15 reports the
marginal probit estimates of country fixed eﬀects. For instance, Figure 15 shows that,
compared to the Swedes, the Romanians exhibit a 32 percentage points higher probability
of distrusting each other. The highest levels of distrust in 1990 are in socialist countries.
Table 5 reports marginal probit estimates of the eﬀect of living in a transition economy
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Figure 15: Marginal country fixed eﬀects on distrust relatively to Sweden. Source: WVS
1990.
on diﬀerent indicators of distrust in 1990. We create a dummy equal to 1 if the country
used to be socialist, and 0 if it belongs to the OECD. We control for age, education,
gender, income and political aﬃliation.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the probability of distrusting others rises by 16.9
percentage points when the respondent is living in a transition rather than an OECD
country during the 1990 wave. The eﬀect is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. Distrust in civil servants and distrust in justice are also higher by 5.5 percentage
points and 6.3 percentage points, respectively, in transition than in OECD countries. The
same pattern holds for distrust in companies. In 1990, living in a transition economy
increases the probability of distrusting business by 15.1 percentage points relative to
OECD countries. The eﬀect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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5.2 Corruption and demand for regulation in transition economies
What is the eﬀect of transition on the perception of corruption and the demand for
regulation? Our model predicts that liberalization in a low trust environment triggers
a rise in corruption at a given level of regulation, leading people to demand even more
regulation.
We start with suggestive evidence on the perceived change in corruption in transition
economies. The LITS asks the following question: “To what extent do you agree with the
following statement: There is less corruption now than in 1989”. The answer can take on
five values from 1 to 5, with 1 for “Strongly Agree”, 2 for “Agree”, 3 for “Neither agree
or disagree”, 4 for “Disagree” and 5 for “Strongly Disagree”. To ease the interpretation
of the results, we construct a 1-0 dummy variable Increase in corruption that takes on
the value 1 if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement that there
is less corruption in 2006 than in 1989, and 0 if the respondent strongly agrees or agrees
with that statement. Figure 16 reports the country average value of the indicator Increase
in corruption. The indicator measures the share of households who believe that the level
of corruption is higher in 2006 than in 1989. The overwhelming majority of households
report that corruption has increased. The average value of this indicator among the
transition economies reaches 81 percent. Georgia and Belarus are the only two countries
where the majority of households think that corruption has not increased over this period.
We then estimate the rise in corruption in transition economies by using the World
Values Survey. This database reports two directly related questions: “Do you think it can
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Someone accepting bribes
in the course of his duties? Cheating on taxes?”. The questions take on values ranging
from 1 for never justifiable to 10 for always justifiable. To ease the interpretation of the
results, we create dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that bribing and
cheating on taxes respectively is never justifiable, and zero otherwise. The results are
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similar when we work with the original coding.
We compare attitudes towards corruption in the 1990 and 2000 waves by using an
interaction term between the wave 2000 dummy and the transition economy dummy. We
also include the wave 2000 dummy separately to measure the change in attitudes in OECD
countries. The other baseline controls include age, education, gender, income category,
political aﬃliation and country fixed eﬀects.
Table 6 shows that the share of people who think it can be justified to accept a bribe
in the course of one’s own duties has increased by 6.2 percentage points in transition
economies. Similarly the share of people who consider that it can be justified to cheat on
taxes has risen by 7.8 percentage points in these countries over the decade. The eﬀect is
statistically significant at the five percent level with robust standard errors. In contrast,
acceptance of corruption or of cheating on taxes have dropped in other OECD countries
over this period.
We next document the changes in attitudes toward regulation in transition economies
and OECD countries in 1990 and in 2000 using the WVS. We look at two main questions.
The first concerns attitudes toward competition. This variable takes on values from 1
to 10, a higher score indicating that the respondent sees competition as harmful. The
second relates to private versus state ownership of business: “Do you think that private
ownership of business should be increased or government ownership of business should be
increased?”. The answer takes on values from 1 to 10, a lower score indicating a preference
for private ownership.
We measure the change in the demand for regulation in transition economies over the
decade by looking at the eﬀect of the dummy for transition economies interacted with
the wave 2000. We also include the wave 2000 dummy without the interaction to capture
the change in the demand for regulation in OECD countries. We control for age, gender,
years of education, income, political aﬃliation and country fixed eﬀects. Additional re-
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gressions with religious aﬃliation and employment status yield similar results, but with
fewer observations.
Table 7 reports the estimates. Column 1 shows the ordered probit estimates of atti-
tudes toward competition. The sign of the interaction term between the transition dummy
and the wave 2000 dummy is strongly positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. To get a sense of the economic impact, we rescale the variable between 1 and 0, 1
indicating that the respondent tends to consider competition harmful (score higher than
6 for the original 1-10 scale). The marginal probit estimates indicate that the probabil-
ity of disliking competition has increased by 29.4 percentage points over the nineties in
transition economies. The sign associated with the wave 2000 dummy, taken separately,
is also positive, suggesting a rise in dislike of competition in OECD countries as well. Yet
the eﬀect is much smaller.
Column 2 shows the ordered probit estimates for government versus private ownership.
The sign on the interaction term between the transition dummy and the wave 2000 dummy
is positive, suggesting that individuals in transitions economies have become more opposed
to private ownership. The eﬀect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The eﬀect
is also economically sizeable. To ease the interpretation, we create a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent is more favorable to government than to private ownership (score
higher than 6 on the original 1-10 scale). The marginal probit estimates suggest that the
support for government ownership has increased by 34.7 percentage points in transition
economies between 1990 and 2000. The sign of the wave 2000 dummy taken separately is
positive but not statistically significant. The Wald test rejects the equality of coeﬃcients.
Table 7 also reports the eﬀect of additional controls. Losers from transition might want
more government regulation to help them. We address this concern by interacting the
level of education with the interacted dummy transition economy times wave 2000. The
results show that the preference for government regulation has dropped among the more
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Figure 16: Country-average share of households who consider that there is more corruption
now than around 1989. Source: LITS, 2006
educated people over this period. The eﬀect is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level.
The change in attitudes towards government regulation could also be driven by the
economic decline and growth in inequality. We include measures of unemployment, GDP
change and GINI indices. The IMF provides yearly data for GDP change and unem-
ployment rates. We average these data over the period 1990-94 and 1999-2000. The
GINI indices correspond to the early 1990s and early 2000s and are taken from the World
Bank. These variables are statistically much less significant than the interaction between
the dummies transition economy and wave 2000.
5.3 Change in social capital in transition economies
We finally turn to the evolution of social capital in transition economies following liber-
alization. We begin with descriptive figures.
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Figure 17 describes the evolution of distrust based on the LITS database. Respon-
dents are asked to compare their current level of distrust in 2006 with that they used
to have before 1989. We create a variable Increase in distrust defined as the diﬀerence
between distrust in 2006 and the remembered level of distrust before 1989. The indicator
potentially takes on values in the interval [-4,4], a higher score indicating an increase in
distrust. Figure 17 reports the country average values for this indicator. Distrust has
increased in all transition countries, as far as people remember.
One may worry that individuals have forgotten their true levels of distrust before 1989.
Due to transition hardships, they might overestimate the extent of cooperation during the
good old days. We thus also look at the changes in trust in transition economies across
periods based on the WVS database, where trust levels are reported contemporaneously.
Figure 18 reports the change in the country-average level of distrust from the 1990
and 2000 wave. A positive value indicates a rise in distrust over the decade. The analysis
focuses on all the Eastern European economies covered by the WVS for both 1990 and
2000. As it turns out, distrust in others has risen in all countries but Slovenia.
Table 8 estimates the eﬀect of transition on social capital by comparing the evolution
of distrust in OECD and transition countries between 1990 and 2000. We measure the
change in distrust in transition economies with an interaction term between a wave 2000
dummy and a transition economy dummy. We also include a wave 2000 dummy separately
to measure the change in distrust in OECD countries. Baseline controls include age,
education, gender, income category, political aﬃliation and country fixed eﬀects.
Table 8 - Column 1 shows that distrust in others has increased in both transition and
OECD countries. But this rise is not statistically significant in OECD countries when
we control for country fixed eﬀects and individual characteristics. In contrast, the rise
in distrust in transition economies is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The
eﬀect is sizeable: the probability of distrusting others has increased by 6.3 percentage
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points in transition economies, almost twice as much as in OECD countries.
Table 8 - Column 2 shows a statistically significant increase in distrust of civil servants
in transition economies. Individuals living in transition economies are 12.2 percentage
points more likely to distrust civil servants in 2000 than in 1990. During the same period,
distrust in civil servants has declined by 3.5 percentage points in OECD countries. The
Wald test confirms this contrast. Columns 3 and 4 show that distrust in justice and
in business have risen by 11.2 percentage points and 9.8 percentage points, respectively,
in transition economies. The rise is statistically significant. Distrust in justice and in
business has also increased slightly in OECD countries, but the eﬀect is not statistically
significant. TheWald test rejects the equality of coeﬃcients between transition and OECD
economies.
In summary, the findings of this section confirm all the predictions of the model con-
cerning the transition from socialism, as illustrated in Figure 7. Liberalization of en-
trepreneurial activity starting from a low level of social capital has increased corruption,
invited a demand for greater state control of economic activity, and reduced trust. This
evidence points to a link from the regulatory environment to social capital accumulation.
6 Civic education, social capital and regulation
We finally go back to the central element of our model that accounts for the perpetuation
of both culture and institutions, namely family values.12 This section documents the
relationship between family values on the one hand and distrust and regulation on the
other. We then use transition economies to document changes in family values.
12Another natural candidate for this process of social capital accumulation is investment in education.
As stressed by Almond and Verba (1989), Putnam (2001), Helliwell and Putnam (2007) and Glaeser et
al. (2007), education is strongly associated with civic behaviors. Putnam (2001) notes that "education
is by far the strongest correlate that I have discovered of civic engagement in all its forms". Dee (2004)
probes into the causal impact of education on civic behaviors by using the geographical availibility of
junior colleges as an instrument.
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Figure 17: Change between distrust in 2006 and distrust before 1989. Source LITS 2006.
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Figure 18: Change in distrust between the waves 2000 and 1990 of the WVS database.
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6.1 Macro evidence
We measure civic education by using the following question in the World Values Survey:
“Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if
any, do you consider to be especially important: Tolerance and Respect for others?”. The
variable takes on the value 1 if the respondent mentions the quality and 0 otherwise. This
question covers 50 countries for which we also have indicators of distrust and regulation.
Figure 19 reports the relationship between the country share of individuals who men-
tion tolerance as a key quality and the country average level of distrust. The correlation
is negative, and the R2 is .22. Figure 20 documents the other side of the relationship
between regulation and civic education. There is a strong negative correlation between
the regulation of entry and the country share of individuals who believe in transmitting
tolerance and respect of others to children. The relationship is also significant, the R2
reaching .33. The same negative correlations show up if we consider teaching unselfishness
and independence or if we use other indicators of regulation, but these correlations are
statistically less significant.
Table 9 confirms these findings with regressions with multiple controls: average per
capita income during the period 1980-2000, average democracy score for the period 1970-
2000 based on Polity IV, and an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization based on Alesina
et al. (2003). These data, along with the family values indicator, are available for 40
countries.
Column 1 reports the stripped down regression of distrust on civic education, defined
as the country average share of households who mention tolerance and respect among the
key values to transmit to children in the WVS. Civic education is negatively correlated
with distrust and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Other variables likely to
influence social capital such as ethnic fractionalization are no longer statistically significant
once civic education is controlled for. Column 2 reports a strong negative correlation
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Figure 19: Correlation between the country-share of distrust and the share of parents in
favor of teaching tolerance to children. Source: World Values Survey.
between regulation of entry and civic education. The correlation is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level.
6.2 Change in civic education in transition economies
A key prediction of the model is that liberalization in a low trust environment reduces
the incentive to become civic. We test this prediction by looking at how parental values
transmitted to children have evolved in transition economies.
Table 10 documents the evolution of parental values in transition economies between
the 1990 and 2000 waves of the WVS. We focus on two potential qualities that the parents
should teach their children: “Tolerance and Respect for others” and “Unselfishness”. We
capture the change in parental values in transition economies by including an interaction
term between the wave 2000 dummy and the transition economy dummy. We include
separately a wave 2000 dummy to capture the evolution of parental values in OECD
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Figure 20: Correlation between the Regulation of entry and the share of parents in favor
of teaching tolerance to children. Source: Djankov et al. (2002) and World Values Survey.
countries compared to that in transition economies. Baseline controls include age, age
squared, education, gender, income category, and political aﬃliation.
Table 10 shows that the probability of mentioning tolerance or unselfishness as a key
value to teach children has decreased in transition economies between 1990 and 2000.
The drop is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In contrast, the likelihood
of mentioning tolerance and unselfishness has steadily increased in OECD countries, the
coeﬃcient being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results suggest that
people have reduced investment in social capital in transition economies.
We next evaluate the consequences of this change in civic education on the level of
social capital of younger generations in transition economies. If the transition experiment
was capturing the eﬀect of chaos or poor law enforcement on social capital, then the
eﬀect should be more pronounced among the older people longing for the good old days.
If social capital is the result of family values being directly aﬀected by the change in the
economic environment, we should see that trust has changed among the young people but
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not among the old, whose investment in social capital is already sunk. We distinguish five
diﬀerent cohorts: 18-35 years old, 35-44 years old, 45-54 years old, 55-64 years old and
individuals older than 65 years. We capture the evolution of distrust across cohorts by
interacting the cohort eﬀect and the wave 2000. We also include the level of education,
gender, and income. The cohort 65 years and older is the reference group.
Table 11 reports regressions of distrust on the diﬀerent cohorts. The eﬀect of wave 2000
on younger cohorts is negative and statistically significant in transition economies. Since
we control for education, income and unemployment status, the sharper rise in distrust
among the younger cohort cannot be entirely attributed to diﬀerences in economic gains
from the transition across cohorts. This result is consistent with our prediction that
deregulation changes civic education within families and leads to a decline in the stock of
social capital. In contrast, this result is at odds with the “good old days” hypothesis.
7 Conclusion
We note two aspects of the problem that were mentioned in the discussion, but not
analyzed in any detail. The first is the relationship between our findings and research on
legal origins. A number of papers summarized in La Porta et al. (2008) show that the
very same measures of government regulation that we consider in this paper are predicted
by legal origins. This raises the question of the relationship between legal origins and
distrust, and their respective influences on regulation. It is easy to show that French
legal origin countries, on average, exhibit lower levels of trust than common law and
Scandinavian legal origin countries, but is there a deeper relationship here?
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that France and England developed their legal sys-
tems many centuries ago in response to very diﬀerent levels of disorder prevalent in the
two countries, with England being much more peaceful and orderly than France. The
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two legal traditions were subsequently transplanted through conquest and colonization
to many parts of the world, and there is no reason to think that the colonies of the two
countries started with diﬀerent levels of distrust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2008). On the
other hand, our paper suggests that, over time, the level of regulation can itself influence
investment in social capital. It is possible, then, that compared to the English colonies,
the more heavily regulated French colonies over the decades have developed lower levels
of trust (because of a more controlling role of the state) and that this lower trust has
generated continued demand for government regulation. If this hypothesis is correct, one
reason that legal origins have had such a pervasive influence on outcomes over the years
might be that their influence is mediated by trust in a self-fulfilling equilibrium. This
might be a new explanation for the persistent eﬀects of legal origins.
A second aspect of the problem that deserves some additional attention is our assump-
tion that accumulation of social capital is largely decentralized because it takes place in
families. In fact, in our model, if the community can agree on a program of public educa-
tion that raises the level of social capital, and if this program is successfully implemented,
the bad equilibrium is eliminated. It is unquestionably the case that, in some countries,
an important goal of public education is to build social capital (Glaeser et al. 2007).
But, evidently, this goal is not universal. This observation is of great consequence to
our discussion of transition economies, and in particular raises the question of whether,
in light of our evidence, these economies are stuck to a future of low social capital, heavy
regulation, and low output. Alternatively, can education lead the way toward greater
civicness, lower regulation, and higher productivity? We suspect that the future of many
transition economies is indeed brighter than our short run analysis suggests, largely due to
the possibilities of public education. Nonetheless, the discussion raises the open question
of what are the possibilities and the limits of public education in raising the level of social
capital, especially in environments where parents do not share an interest in civicness.
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More generally, the analysis points to a broad complementarity between social capital
and free market economics, which remains to be explored.
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Table 1: Distrust and Regulation: OLS estimates
Dependent variable
Regulation
of entry
(1)
Regulation of labor
market
(2)
Court formalism
index
(3)
Distrust in others
1.431***
(.380)
.297*
(.177)
2.525***
(.866)
Ln (GDP
per capita)
-.039
(.028)
.002
(.023)
.078
(.115)
Education
-.046
(.031)
-.009
(.012)
.005
(.065)
Ln (Population)
.085
***
(.037)
-.015
(.017)
.032
(.082)
Observations 57 57 53
R2 .55 .135 .162
Source: World Values Survey, Djankov et al. (2002, 2003a) and Botero et al. (2004)
Table 2: Distrust in Business, Institutions and Regulation: OLS estimates
Regulation of entry
Uncivicness
.772**
(.329)
Distrust Justice
3.216***
(1.004)
Distrust Civil Servants
1.746***
(.575)
Distrust Parliament
1.055**
(.445)
Distrust Companies
1.542***
(.496)
R2 .45 .52 .48 .45 .55
Observations 57 41 57 57 57
Controls: Education, GDP, Population. Uncivicness: cheating on unemployment benefits
Source: World Values Survey and Djankov et al. (2002)
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Table 3: Distrust and demand for regulation: Micro estimates - Ordered probit
Explanatory variables (Columns)
Dependent variables (Rows)
Distrust
others
Distrust
justice
Distrust civil
servants
Distrust
companies
(1) Competition is harmful
.027***
(.010)
.035***
(.008)
.024***
(.008)
.172***
(.008)
N 73607 69523 71779 60611
(2) Government should
take more responsibility
.051***
(.001)
.018**
(.006)
.015**
(.006)
.088***
(.006)
N 73389 69523 71779 60611
(3) In democracies the economic
system runs badly
.134***
(.009)
.081***
(.010)
.082***
(.008)
.053***
(.009)
N 76061 47542 74288 65011
Source: WVS - Controls: country fixed eﬀects, gender, age, education, income, political aﬃliation
Robust standard error clustered at the country level. ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10.
Table 4: Distrust and Demand for Regulation in Transition economies- Marginal Probit
estimates
Dependent variable Preference for a planned rather than a market economy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distrust others
.040***
(.012)
Distrust government
.032**
(.015)
Distrust courts
.036***
(.012)
Distrust banks
.057***
(.016)
Distrust foreign
companies
.078***
(.014)
Household life better
now than before 1989
-.047***
(.006)
-.048***
(.007)
-.044***
(.007)
-.042***
(.007)
-.040***
(.008)
Inequality should
be reduced
.016
(.031)
.014*
(.008)
.014**
(.007)
.010
(.007)
.013*
(.007)
R2 .062 .059 .054 .058 .058
Observations 9808 9971 9584 9345 7982
Controls: gender, age, education, income, occupation, income scale, country fixed eﬀects.
Source: LITS. Robust standard errors clustered at country level: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10.
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Table 5: Initial distrust in transition economies relative to OECD countries - Marginal
Probit estimates
Dependent variable
Distrust
others
(1)
Distrust
civil servants
(2)
Distrust
justice
(3)
Distrust
companies
(4)
Transition economies
in 1990
.169***
(.033)
.055*
(.033)
.063**
(.032)
.151***
(.046)
R2 .054 .011 .015 .020
Observations 17028 17794 17854 17615
Controls: gender, age, education, income, political aﬃliation. Source: WVS survey.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10.
Table 6: Rise in Corruption in Transition economies: Micro estimates
Dependent variable
Justifiable
to accept bribes
Justifiable to
cheat on taxes
Wave 2000
-.012
(.015)
-.035**
(.014)
Transition economies x
Wave 2000
.062**
(.030)
.078**
(.035)
Wald test : Wave 2000 -
Transition x Wave 2000
Prob>χ2(1) =
0 .060
Prob>χ2(1)
= 0.008
R2 .069 .062
Observations 63344 61928
WVS 1990 and 2000. Controls: Country fixed eﬀects, age, gender,
education, political aﬃliation, income. Robust standard errors
clustered at country level: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10.
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Table 7: Rise in the Demand for Regulation in Transition economies: Micro estimates
Competition is
harmful (1-10)
Government should own
the businesses (1-10)
(1) (2)
Wave 2000
.128***
(.038)
.087
(.069)
Transition x
wave 2000
.975***
(.141)
1.009***
(.219)
Education x
transition x
wave 2000
-.032***
(.004)
-.027***
(.008)
Gini Index
1.552*
(1.379)
2.835*
(1.563)
GDP Growth
-.011
(.014)
-.036**
(.017)
Unemployment
-.000
(.000)
-.020*
(.011)
R2 .022 .025
Wald test : Wave 2000 -
Transitions x Wave 2000
Prob>χ2(1) =
0 .062
Prob>χ2(1) =
0 .008
Observations 44689 44098
WVS 1990 and 2000. Controls: Country fixed eﬀects, age, gender,
education, political aﬃliation, income. Robust standard errors clustered
at country level: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10.
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Table 8: Rise in Distrust : Micro estimates
Dependent variable
Distrust
others
Distrust
civil servants
Distrust
justice
Distrust
companies
Wave 2000
.038
(.027)
-.035**
(.014)
.021
(.025)
.028
(.022)
Transition economies x
Wave 2000
.063*
(.033)
.122***
(.035)
.112***
(.038)
.098***
(.015)
Wald test : Wave 2000 -
Transition x Wave 2000
Prob>χ2(1)
= .65
Prob>χ2(1)
= .00
Prob>χ2(1)
= .09
Prob>χ2(1)
= .002
R2 .081 .031 .046 .049
Observations 55015 49526 45341 45524
WVS 1990 and 2000. Controls: country fixed eﬀects, gender, age, education, income, political
aﬃliation. Robust standard errors clustered at country level. ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10.
Table 9: Civic education, Distrust and Regulation: OLS macro estimates
Dependent variable Distrust in others Regulation
Civic education:
Tolerance and Respect
-.697***
(.171)
-2.14***
(.780)
Ln (GDP
per capita)
-.004
(.026)
-.116
(.076)
Democracy
-.000
(.001)
.010
(.029)
Fractionalization
.035
(.096)
-.171
(.271)
Observations 40 40
R2 .30 .44
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Table 10: Change in Civic Education in Transition economies
Dependent variable
Parental Values
Respect and Tolerance
(1)
Parental Values
Unselfishness
(2)
Wave 2000
.041***
(.001)
.027***
(.005)
Transition economies x
Wave 2000
-.045***
(.009)
-.059***
(.008)
Wald test : Wave 2000 -
Transition x Wave 2000
Prob>χ2(1) =
0 .000
Prob>χ2(1)
= 0.000
R2 .045 .098
Observations 55900 55898
WVS 1990 and 2000. Controls: country fixed eﬀects, gender, age, education, income,
political aﬃliation. Robust standard errors clustered at country level: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10.
Table 11: Distrust among young generations in Transition economies: Micro estimates
Dependent variable Distrust
Coeﬀ Std Error Coeﬀ Std Error
Age 65 + x
Wave 2000
Reference
Age 65+ x
Wave 2000 x
Transition
Reference
Age 18-35 x
Wave 2000
.006 (.017)
Age 18-34 x
Wave 2000 x
Transition
.040** (.019)
Age 35-44 x
Wave 2000
-.020 (.016)
Age 35-44 x
Wave 2000 x
Transition
.038* (.021)
Age 45-54 x
Wave 2000
-.014 (.013)
Age 45-54 x
Wave 2000 x
Transition
.013 (.020)
Age 55-64 x
Wave 2000
-.018 (.013)
Age 45-54 x
Wave 2000 x
Transition
.019 (.021)
R2 .074
Observations 69561
WVS 1990 and 2000. Controls: country fixed eﬀects, gender, age, education,
income, political aﬃliation. Robust standard errors clustered at country level.
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Table 12: Variable definition
Variables Description
N
Countries
Other variables
Log of GNP
per capita
Natural logarithm of GNP per capita in 2000,
Atlas method, expressed in current US dollars.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
57
Democracy Index
Average score for the period 1980-200
Source: Polity IV
57
Average years of
schooling
Years of schooling of the total population aged over 25,
average of 1995 and 2000. Source: Barro and Lee (2000)
<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.htm>.
57
Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
The index measures the probability that two randomly
selected people from a given country will not belong to
the same ethnolinguistic group. The index is based on
the number and size distinguished by their ethnic and
linguistic status. Source: Easterly and Levine (1997).
47
Regulation
of good market
The index measures the (ln) number of steps in order
to open a business. Source: Djankov et al. (2002).
57
Regulation
of labor market
The index measures the rigidity of employment contracts
in 1999, based on i) diﬃculty of hiring, ii) rigidity of
hours, iii) diﬃculty of firing. Source: Botero et al. (2004).
57
Court formalism
index
The index measures substantive and procedural statutory
intervention in a case for evicting a tenant that has
not paid rent or to collect a bounced check.
Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
53
55
Table 13: Variable definitions
Variables Description Mean
Std
error
Distrust
Share of people who answer “need to very careful in
dealing with people” to the question: “Generally speaking,
would you say thatmost people can be trusted or that you need
to be very careful in dealing with people?”. We measure the
average country level of distrust over the four waves
of the WVS.
.70 .47
Uncivic
Share of people who do not answer “never justifiable”
to the question: “Do you think it is unjustifiable or not
to cheat on government benefits”. The answers ranges
from 1 for never justifiable to 10 for always justifiable.
We calculate the country-share of respondents who answers
never justifiable averaged over the four waves of the WVS.
2.32 2.28
Distrust in
companies
Share of people who answer “no confidence” to the question:
“Do you have confidence in major companies”.
The answers range from 1 for a lot
of confidence to 4 for no confidence. We calculate the average
country-share of respondents who answers no confidence over
the four waves of the WVS
.54 .50
Distrust in
legal system
Share of people who answer “no confidence” to the question:
“Do you have confidence in the legal system”. The answers range
from 1 for a lot of confidence to 4 for no confidence.
We calculate the average country share of respondents who
answers no confidence over the four waves of the WVS
.49 .49
Distrust in
parliament
Share of people who answer “no confidence” to the question:
“Do you have confidence in the parliament”.
The answers range from 1 for a lot of confidence to 4
for no confidence. We calculate the average country share
of respondents who answers no confidence over the four
waves of the WVS
.52 .49
Distrust in
civil servants
Share of people who answer “no confidence” to
the question: “Do you have confidence in civil servants”.
The answers range from 1 for a lot of confidence to 4
for no confidence. We calculate the average country share
of respondents who answers no confidence over
the four waves of the WVS
.55 .50
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Table 14: Variable definition
Variables Description Mean Std
Error
State should
control firms
Country average score to the question: “Do you think
that the state should give complete freedom to the firm
or that the state should control firm”. The answers range
from 1 for complete freedom to 10 for complete control.
The score is averaged over the four waves of the WVS.
5.41 2.90
Competition is
harmful
Country average score to the question: “Do you think that
competition is good and yield new ideas, or competition
is harmful and brings the worst from humain being”. The
answers range from 1 for complete freedom to 10 for
complete control. The score is averaged over the four
waves of the WVS.
3.55 2.49
Economic system
runs badly under
a democracy
Share of respondents who answer yes to the question:
“Do you think that the economic system runs necessarily
badly under a democracy”. The indicator equal one if the
respondent answers yes and 0 if the answer is no. The
indicator is averaged over the four waves of the WVS.
.33 .47
Education:
tolerance and
respect for
other people
Share of respondents who answer “especially important”
to the question “Here is a list of qualities which children
can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any do you
consider to be especially important: Tolerance and
Respect for other people”. The indicator equal 1 if the
answer is “especially important”, and 0 if the answer is
“not important”. The indicator is averaged over the four
waves of the WVS.
.66 .47
Education:
Unselfishness
Share of respondents who answer “especially important”
to the question: “Here is a list of qualities which children
can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any do you
consider to be especially important:Unselfishness”. The
indicator equal 1 if the answer is “especially important”,
and 0 if the answer is “not important”. The indicator is
averaged over the four waves of the WVS.
.26 .44
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Table 15: Variable definitions: LITS database
Beliefs Description Mean Std Dev
Distrust in
2006
Dummy variable equal 1 if the respondent has
complete or some distrust
.60 .48
Distrust before
1989
Dummy variable equal 1 if the respondent
has complete or some distrust
.20 .40
Rise in corruption
Dummy variable equal 1 if the respondent
strongly agree or agree that there is more
corruption now than before 1989
.81 .38
Planned economy
Dummy variable equal 1 if the respondent
prefers a planned economy to a free market
economy under some circunstances
.37 .48
Inequality
1 if support for state intervention to reduce
the gap between the rich and the poor
.93 .25
Life better now
1 if the respondent considers that the
household is better now compared to 1989
.41 .49
Table 16: Sample characteristics: LITS database
Characteristics Mean Std Dev
Men .48 .50
Age 46.94 16.98
Self-employed 0.08 0.28
Education
No education .05 .22
Compulsory education .16 .37
Secondary education .22 .41
Professional education .37 .48
University degree .19 .39
Post-graduate education .01 .09
Occupation
Unemployed .09 .29
White collar .17 .38
Blue collar .18 .38
Student .03 .16
Housewife .06 .25
Retired .21 .41
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